microcode, compilers, and supercomputer architecture

From: Buck Savage <hhacker_at_home.com>
Date: Mon Apr 5 15:39:36 1999

>[I'd suggested that we take this discussion off the list. I'm continuing
>to reply here in this case only because I don't want people to get the
>incorrect idea that Godel's Incompleteness Theorem can be used to magically
>explain away any philosophical problem regarding computers.]
>
>> Is this use of the word "assembly" not yours? I, sir, am quoting you,
not
>> me!
>
>OK, that one was mine. It wasn't in the context you originally quoted, or
>even from the same message you quoted
>(<19990405060635.29296.qmail_at_brouhaha.com>). I had used it three
>hours earlier in the discussion
(<19990405030452.28640.qmail_at_brouhaha.com>).
>So perhaps you see why I didn't understand what you were complaining about.
>It is customary to include a brief quote of the actual context you are
>referring to.
>

The quote was passed down several layers of reply. I expect one to
remember one's own words. Your failure to do so does not provide any
obligation on my part.

>> That says nothing about the general case
>> that humans have superior intellectual capacity vis-a-vis the computer.
>
>In the general case, I've never claimed that they do. I've only claimed
that
>in a sufficiently limited problem domain with a time limit (i.e., the
solution
>value vs. time curve is a flat with a sharp drop to zero), a computer may
>reach a better solution than a human would. I also claim that this is true
>for other common solution value vs. time curves; if the solution is worth
$x
>today but only $x/2 tomorrow, the computer may produce a more valuable
>solution than would a human.
>

Time limits accepted but, that is not my concern. I am refering to an
ultimate issue, which is that humans have intelligence, computers
do not. Any high-speed moron has the opportunity to surpass a
considerate intellect. Witness the ability of Deep Blue to challenge
the best chess player. Yet, ultimately, a human can decide by means
not algorithmic.

>> What you have failed to address is that the human intellect is not
limited
>> by the capacity to algorithmatise a solution.
>[and later:]
>> Humans have the capacity to make judgements by means outside of those
>> mathematical and logical, hence the reference to Penrose.
>
>Sure. A human may proceed in a manner that is not based upon logical
>deduction or any (obvious) deterministic algorithm.
>
>It is yet to be proven that this human ability (as manifested in complex
>problem-solving) is not equivalent to a non-deterministic algorithm,
>or even to a sufficiently complex deterministic system. Penrose claims
>that quantum uncertaintly is necessary to intelligence. While he provides
>insufficient proof of this claim (really just anecdotal evidence), as an
>argument against machine intelligence it is a red herring, since it is
>not especially difficult to build a system that uses quantum uncertainty
>to influence nondeterministic algorithms.
>

This begs the question, for proof is necessarily mathematical (I, for one,
do not agree with Judicial notions of proof, such as a preponderance of
the evidence). That you hinge your argument upon the lack of a proof
of the means of some human ability simply points to flaws therein.

>> in particular, the notions of Godel: that within any axiomatic system, th
>> answers to some positable questions are indeterminable.
>
>You know, since you mentioned the book GEB, I thought you might have been
>trying to bring Godel's Incompleteness Theorem into the discussion. But
>since you didn't specifically state that, I wanted to give you the benefit
>of the doubt.
>
>The Incompleteness Theorum if very useful for certain lines of reasoning.
>And it might be relevant to the strong AI problem. But it has no relevance
>to the compiler problem we've been discussing.
>

It is relevant to the notion that humans must use methods not algorithmic.

>In the compilers "axiomatic system", it is not possible to even construct
>the kind of questions to which GIT refers.
>
>The compiler is not burdened with proving that it is correct, or that its
>own output is correct. At most we are asking it to select the more
efficient
>of several proposed solutions. This in some sense does involve a "proof",
>but the required proof is no of the validity of the axioms (i.e., the
>compiler algorithm), nor is it a proof that the "system" is
self-consistent.
>
>> For all the nit-picky details of the works of these masters, the points
they
>> make are far grander. The real value of their works is not kept solely
>> within the realm from which their conclusions emerge, but within which
>> such conclusions find additional value.
>
>If you know where to apply them. You can't just willy-nilly claim that
>GIT applies to any random problem.
>

This is one of the wonders of human intelligence: to make leaps of logic
and application.

>If you are going to maintain that GIT precludes compilers generating code
>as efficient as the best human-generated code, you'd best be prepared to
>present a logical argument as to why GIT applies. It's not a magic wand,
>and I'm not going to concede your point at the mere mention of it.

I am not applying GIT to the operation of compilers. Instead, I am applying
it to the operation of human intelligence. Whether you concede the point
makes no difference to me. My purpose is to refute your claims of the
superiority of software versus human intelligence, and that is all.

William R. Buckley
Received on Mon Apr 05 1999 - 15:39:36 BST